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Cost-Effectiveness of Targeted Reemployment Bonuses
Abstract
Targeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified
as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting
bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not
steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not
optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the
half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.

I.

Introduction
Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments were conducted on

unemployment insurance (UI) recipients in Illinois, New Jersey, Washington, and Pennsylvania.
These experiments offered lump sum payments to UI recipients who began new jobs within a
prescribed period and remained employed for at least four months. The bonuses were designed
to speed reemployment of UI recipients and thereby reduce UI benefit payments. Findings from
the four experiments demonstrated that, as expected, the reemployment bonuses reduced UI
payments. However, the reductions in payments were usually not large enough to fully cover the
costs of paying and administering the bonuses (Decker and O’Leary 1995). The bonuses,
therefore, were not cost- effective from the perspective of the UI system.
In 1993, the federal government passed laws requiring states to establish Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems to target reemployment services to UI
recipients expected to face long unemployment spells.1 The passage of the WPRS legislation
was based largely on evidence that providing targeted UI recipients with reemployment services
reduced UI payments enough to pay for the costs of providing the services (Corson et al. 1989;
Meyer 1995). Federal legislation proposed in 1994 would have permitted states to offer a
targeted reemployment bonus, but the proposal was not enacted. Currently, reemployment
bonuses are not among the reemployment services that states may offer. In 2003, however, the
Bush administration proposed a targeted reemployment bonus as a feature of new personal
reemployment accounts.

1

This targeting approach is also used as part of the Self Employment Assistance program which was
enacted in late 1993 as a UI program option for states.

1

While the experiments demonstrated that a non-targeted bonus is not cost-effective,
targeting reemployment bonuses to a segment of the UI recipient population using the WPRS
approach might yield different findings. This would depend on the extent to which those
targeted for the bonus offer respond to the offer, and whether those responding would have had
relatively long UI spells in the absence of the offer. This paper examines that question using
data from the two most policy-relevant experiments—those in Pennsylvania and Washington.
We calculate bonus effects for subgroups of recipients defined according to their predicted
probability of exhausting UI benefits. We then investigate whether the bonus effects on UI
receipt are larger for recipients with higher predicted probabilities of exhaustion. We also
examine whether the net benefits of a bonus offer are likely to vary according to the predicted
probability of exhaustion, and if so, whether one can use the probabilities to target the bonus
offer so as to make it cost effective. While small sample sizes preclude strong conclusions, the
initial results presented here suggest a potential role for targeting in making reemployment
bonuses cost-effective and a useful policy tool.

II.

The Reemployment Bonus Experiments and Eligibility Screening
The first bonus experiment conducted in Illinois during 1984–85 estimated a 1.15 week

reduction in the average duration of UI compensated unemployment in response to a $500 bonus
offer for reemployment within 11 weeks (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).

Subsequent

experiments, attempting to validate the impressive Illinois findings, yielded more modest effect
estimates. A 1985–86 experiment in New Jersey involving a bonus offer that declined with the
duration of unemployment and reached zero after 12 weeks generated a more modest reduction
in UI duration (Corson et al. 1989). To identify the ideal bonus amount and offer duration, two
2

additional experiments involving 11 different treatments were conducted in 1988–89, in
Pennsylvania (Corson et al. 1992) and Washington (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995).
The bonus experiments had relatively few eligibility requirements for UI recipients to be
included in the treatment or control groups. In the Washington experiment, the only condition
was to meet the standard state UI eligibility requirement on prior earnings. To ensure that
bonuses were directed to permanently separated employees, the Illinois and Pennsylvania
experiments had additional requirements that recipients not have a specific date for recall to their
prior job, and that they not be affiliated with a union hiring hall. The New Jersey experiment had
all these conditions and also required that recipients be at least 25 years of age with at least three
years on the prior job. The New Jersey requirements focused the experiment on recipients who
were likely to be permanently displaced from a long-term job.
The eligibility conditions in these experiments were as inclusive as possible because there
was no consensus on what screens might be adopted for an ongoing program. The inclusive
sample design provided for ex post evaluation of eligibility restrictions. In this paper, we
accomplish this by simulating the effects of different targeting rules defined according to an
estimated probability of UI benefit exhaustion.

III.

Worker Profiling and Reemployment Bonus Effects
All states are now using WPRS systems to target reemployment services (Wandner

1997). Worker profiling is a two-step process: In the first step, permanently separated workers
are identified by screening out those expecting recall to their previous employer and those
subject to an exclusive union hiring hall agreement. The second step is to determine which of
these permanently separated workers are expected to be long-term benefit recipients. In most
3

states, this step involves predicting a recipient’s probability of exhausting UI benefits using a
logit model estimated on historical state data (Olsen et al. 2002). The dependent variable in
these logit models is usually a binary outcome—whether or not the full UI benefit entitlement is
exhausted. The independent variables in the model commonly include educational attainment,
job tenure, employment growth in the previous industry and occupation, and the local
unemployment rate.

Variables for age, gender, and race are prohibited by civil rights

considerations. When a worker opens a new claim for UI benefits, their personal and labor
market characteristics are entered into a profiling equation to predict their probability of benefit
exhaustion.
Using data from the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, we simulate the effects
of using a two-step profiling model to target bonus offers to claimants with a high expected
probability of benefit exhaustion. For both experiments, we start with the full comparison group
samples. In the first step, we exclude all union hiring hall members and those awaiting recall to
their prior job. In the second step, we estimate a statistical model of the probability of benefit
exhaustion for each state. We specify statistical models that are approximately equivalent to the
existing state WPRS models. Both models include explanatory variables to control for each
claimant’s educational attainment, job tenure, industry, and local unemployment rates. The
Washington model also controls for each claimant’s previous occupation.2
Based on the ordering of predicted probabilities of UI benefit exhaustion, Figure 1 shows
the mean predicted probability of exhaustion for decile groups of the comparison samples
contrasted to the actual proportion exhausting benefits in that group. The actual exhaustion rates

2

Details of the profiling models used are given in O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998).
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tend to be higher for decile groups with higher predicted exhaustion rates.3 For example, in
Washington the actual exhaustion rate is 45 percent for the top decile group, compared with 11
percent for the bottom decile group. These findings also demonstrate that the predictive power
of the model—even when used to predict within sample—is somewhat modest.4 That is, the
model is unable to isolate groups of claimants who have either extremely high or low exhaustion
probabilities. Prediction performance of the models is constrained, in part, by exclusion of the
prohibited variables on age, gender, and race. Despite the limitations of the models, these are
representative of what states have to work with in their actual WPRS programs.
Once the benefit exhaustion model has been estimated, the next step in developing rules
for targeting bonus offers to claimants is to set an exhaustion probability to serve as the threshold
for offering a bonus. To examine the effects of various targeting rules, we order predicted
exhaustion probabilities from lowest to highest and compute treatment effects for marginal and
cumulative decile groups in the distribution.
Estimates of the effect of the mean bonus offer on UI receipt are presented in Table 1 for
differing bonus offer targeting thresholds defined at deciles of the distribution of the predicted UI
exhaustion probability.5 The first row of the table reports that the estimated mean effect of
bonus offers made to the top 10 percent of the distribution of predicted UI exhaustion probability
3

Because the results presented in Figure 1 were calculated using the same sample that was used to estimate
the profiling model, these findings do not provide a truly fair tests of the predictive power of the profiling model.
The findings presented later in the paper may therefore depend on having somewhat greater predictive power than
would be available to a state that uses a similar regression model. On the other hand, states that develop more
refined models of UI exhaustion may have comparable or even superior ability to predict exhaustion rates.
4
Model performance can also be judged by contrasting the predicted probability of exhaustion between
those who actually exhaust UI benefits and those who do not. For the control group, the mean predicted probability
among those who actually exhausted benefits was 1.6 percentage points higher in Pennsylvania and 2.0 percentage
points higher in Washington than those who did not exhaust.
5
The mean response reported in Table 1 is computed across five treatments for Pennsylvania and six
treatments for Washington.
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in Pennsylvania is to reduce UI payments by $231, but to increase them by $56 in Washington.
Lowering the offer threshold by ten percentage points of the distribution, the marginal effects for
the 9th decile group are -$265 in Pennsylvania and -$117 in Washington with the cumulative
effects for the top twenty percent of the sample being -$251 in Pennsylvania and -$40 in
Washington. The rows of Table 1 present estimates of bonus offer effects as the bonus offer
threshold is gradually lowered in ten percentage point steps of the predicted UI benefit
exhaustion distribution. Estimates are given both for the marginal and cumulative groups in the
distribution. Estimates are computed by contrasting benefit receipt of treatment group members
with control group members in the same range of predicted probability of UI benefit exhaustion.
The estimates in Table 1 do not provide clear guidance for selecting the probability
threshold that would maximize estimated bonus effects. For the Pennsylvania experiment, the
10th, 9th, 7th, and 5th decile groups have the largest estimated effects. For the Washington
experiment, the 9th and 5th decile groups have the greatest estimated effects.
These findings suggest that although the bonus offers may have larger effects on UI
receipt for groups with higher predicted probabilities of benefit exhaustion, that is not necessarily
the case. So that narrowly targeting bonus offers to those most likely to exhaust—such as those
only in the top decile group—may not maximize the overall response. Given that targeting only
the top of the distribution does not appear to be effective, we instead focus the rest of our
analysis on the effects of targeting the bonus offer using two thresholds further down in the
distribution—the 75th percentile and the 50th percentile.

6

IV.

Net Benefits of Targeted Bonus Offers
To examine the net benefits of targeted bonus offers, Table 2 presents estimates of all the

elements required for computations: UI effects, bonus costs, and earnings effects.

These

estimates are presented for the top 25 percent and top 50 percent predicted as most likely to
exhaust UI and for the full samples for each experiment. For additional insight, estimates are
presented for both the mean of all bonus offers tested in each state as well as for the offer that
generated the best net benefit results in both states: the low bonus amount/long qualification
offer (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998).
We take the perspective of the UI system to evaluate the effect of targeting on the
estimated net benefits of the bonus offers. The UI system benefits from a bonus offer to the
degree that UI payments decline and UI tax revenues rise from increased earnings. At the same
time, the UI system incurs the costs of paying and administering the bonuses.
For the combined bonus treatments, the estimated UI effects tend to be greater for the
targeted recipients than for the full sample.

For example, in Pennsylvania the estimated

reductions in UI receipt are $139 for the top 25 percent of recipients and $158 for the top 50
percent of recipients, compared with $113 for the full sample. In Washington, the estimated
reductions in UI receipt are $30 for the top 25 percent and $53 for the top 50 percent, compared
with $30 for the full sample. Neither experiment provides any evidence that bonus effects on UI
receipt are larger when narrowly targeted to the top 25 percent of recipients compared to
targeting the top 50 percent.
Estimated effects on earnings in the year after an initial UI claim show a consistent
pattern: effects are larger for the targeted groups than for the full sample. For example, in
Pennsylvania the estimated bonus effects on average earnings are $536 and $616 for the top 25
7

and 50 percent of recipients respectively, compared with $318 for the full sample. A similar
pattern exists for the Washington effects on earnings—estimated effects for the targeted
recipients are higher than for the full sample—although all of the Washington estimates are
negative.
Just as the UI benefit savings from the bonus offers tend to be greater when targeted to
recipients with higher exhaustion probabilities, it also appears that the bonus costs are greater for
the targeted groups. In both Pennsylvania and Washington, bonus payment costs are slightly
higher for the top 25 and 50 percent of recipients than for the full sample. The differences are
modest in Pennsylvania, where the average bonus costs are $105 and $104 for the top 25 and top
50 percent of recipients, compared with $95 for the full sample. The differences are similarly
small in Washington: $110 and $119 for the top 25 and top 50 percent, compared with $105 for
the full sample.
Estimated net benefits to the UI system are computed as the dollar value of savings
measured by UI effects, plus UI tax contributions on additional earnings, minus the sum of bonus
payment and program administration costs. The current average UI tax contribution rates on
earnings are 1.00 percent in Pennsylvania and 1.15 percent in Washington.

Program

administration cost was estimated to be $33 per offer in Pennsylvania and $3 in Washington
(Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995). Because of restricted sample sizes,
the net benefit estimates presented in Table 2 are imprecisely estimated. Nonetheless, the pattern
of point estimates is informative.
Targeting offers improves the estimated net benefits of the mean bonus offers. In both
experiments, the net benefits per recipient are negative when estimated for the full sample: -$12
per recipient in Pennsylvania and -$86 per recipient in Washington. In Pennsylvania, targeting
8

improves net benefits per recipient to $6 for the top 25 percent of recipients, and to $27 for the
top 50 percent. In Washington, targeting the offers failed to generate positive net benefits, but
estimated net costs are lower when targeting to the top 50 percent. Since the estimated net
benefits are no greater for the top 25 percent than for the top 50 percent, they provide no
indication that more exclusive targeting on the highest probabilities of exhaustion is a better
strategy.
Compared to the mean bonus offer, the low bonus/long qualification offer in both
experiments generated larger reductions in UI benefit payments, bigger earnings gains, and had
lower bonus payment costs. The low bonus amount/long qualification period treatment in
Pennsylvania offered a bonus equal to three times the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for
reemployment within 12 weeks. This treatment was estimated to generate positive mean net
benefits of $26 per offer, with estimated net benefits of $72 and $88 per offer respectively when
targeting the top 25 percent and top 50 percent of the distribution of predicted exhaustion
probabilities. In Washington the similar treatment offered a bonus of two times the WBA for
reemployment within about 13 weeks. Point estimates of net benefits reported in Table 2 are
positive for the full and targeted samples with an estimated net benefit of $46 when targeted to
the top half of the predicted UI exhaustion probability distribution in Washington.
Among the 11 different bonus designs evaluated in Pennsylvania and Washington, the
most cost-effective treatment design and targeting plan to emerge combines a low bonus amount
with a long qualification period, targeted to the 50 percent most likely to exhaust UI benefits.6

6

O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1998) provide complete details for computing net benefit estimates for
all 11 reemployment bonus treatments tested in Pennsylvania and Washington, including estimates of effects on UI
benefits, bonus payments, and earnings.
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For example, a bonus amount set at three times the WBA, with a qualification period 12 weeks
long, and targeted to the half of claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement
would be a good design. As summarized in Table 2, such a bonus offer should promote quicker
return to work and on average generate net savings to the UI trust fund.

V.

Caveats
Targeting with profiling models improves the appeal of the reemployment bonus program

for employment policy.

However, two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-

effectiveness for an operational program (Meyer 1995): First, an actual bonus program could
have a displacement effect. Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus
increase their rate of reemployment at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus.
Second, there is also the risk that an operational bonus offer program could induce an entry
effect. That is, the availability of a reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of
unemployed job seekers entering the UI system.
If entry and displacement effects are sizeable, actual program cost-effectiveness will be
lowered. However, targeting low bonus amount—long qualification period offers to only those
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks. Targeting would introduce uncertainty
that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance
of a large entry effect. Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displacement, since a
smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.7

7

Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a non-targeted bonus offer to all UI claimants could increase
unemployment durations among those not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.
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VI.

Summary and Conclusions
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides labor force members with partial wage

replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment.

In performing this income

maintenance function, the system potentially prolongs unemployment spells (Decker 1997). To
reduce avoidable joblessness, most states require active job search by UI beneficiaries. In terms
of carrot and stick incentives, such work search rules represent the stick.
In the 1980s, reemployment bonuses were tested as positive reemployment incentives by
field experiments in the federal-state UI system. Reemployment bonuses were intended to speed
return to work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government.
Claimants were still provided the income security of UI, but if they returned to work sooner,
system costs may have been lower. The original findings from the experiments did not generate
overwhelming support for reemployment bonuses.

We have reexamined the evidence to

evaluate whether bonuses targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI benefits would be costeffective.
Profiling models similar to those used by states as part of their Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems were used to identify UI claimants most likely to
exhaust their benefits.

Using such models to target reemployment bonus offers to those

claimants most likely to exhaust UI can increase the cost-effectiveness of bonus offers by
generating larger average reductions in UI benefit payments than non-targeted bonus offers.
However, estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is
gradually tightened.
For several bonus designs, offers made to the top half of the distribution of claimants
most likely to exhaust resulted in bigger benefit payment reductions than offers made to the top
11

quarter of the distribution. While targeting may reduce benefit payments, however, it does not
guarantee that bonus offers will yield positive net benefits. The average size of bonus payments
is also significant.
The single treatment design that emerged as the best candidate for a targeted
reemployment bonus is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period and a four-month
reemployment requirement, targeted to the half of claimants most likely to exhaust their UI
benefit entitlement.

Our estimates suggest that such a targeted bonus offer would yield

appreciable net benefits to the UI trust funds if implemented as a permanent program.

12
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Table 1. Effects of Combined Treatments on UI Benefit Dollars Paid Per Claimant for Decile
Groups of the Predicted Probability of UI Benefit Exhaustion (Standard errors in
parentheses)
Pennsylvania
Washington
Exhaustion probability
Marginal
Cumulative
Marginal
Cumulative
decile group
th
10
-231
-231
56
56
(216)
(216)
(137)
(137)
9th
-265
-251
-117
-40
(220)
(154)
(148)
(101)
8th
-103
-199
-194
-89
(205)
(124)
(156)
(85)
7th
-175
-201*
-24
-72
(219)
(108)
(148)
(74)
6th
11
-158*
29
-53
(193)
(95)
(146)
(66)
5th
-258
-171**
-216
-82
(192)
(85)
(138)
(60)
4th
165
-119
12
-72
(186)
(78)
(129)
(55)
3rd
12
-99
136
-45
(187)
(72)
(122)
(50)
2nd
-225
-112*
-50
-40
(184)
(67)
(115)
(47)
1st
-121
-113*
50
-30
(186)
(63)
(104)
(44)
Sample size
5,199
5,199
12,144
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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12,144

Table 2. Estimated UI Effects, Earnings Effects, Bonus Payment Costs, and Net Benefits to the
UI System per Claimant for Alternative UI Benefit Exhaustion Probability Groups
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Mean bonus offer
Low bonus/Long qualification offer
Top 25 Top 50
Full
Top 25
Top 50
Full
percent percent
sample
percent
percent
Sample
PENNSYLVANIA
UI effects
-139
-158*
-113*
-175
-183
-114
(136)
(95)
(63)
(200)
(135)
(91)
Earnings effects
536
616
318
810
822
363
(568)
(418)
(275)
(810)
(584)
(391)
Bonus payment
105
104
95
78
70
59
costs
(11)
(8)
(5)
(16)
(10)
(7)
Net benefits
6
27
-12
72
88
26
to the UI system
(137)
(95)
(63)
(201)
(135)
(91)
WASHINGTON
UI effects
-30
-53
-30
-75
-106
-74
(92)
(66)
(44)
(124)
(90)
(59)
Earnings effects
-412
-106
-722
-260
649
119
(1509)
(849)
(526)
(2287)
(1399)
(897)
Bonus payment
110
119
105
62
64
52
costs
(6)
(4)
(3)
(6)
(5)
(3)
Net benefits
-88
-70
-86*
7
46
20
to the UI system
(94)
(67)
(45)
(127)
(92)
(60)
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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Figure 1. Predicted and Actual UI Exhaustion Rates
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